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*Cov. L.J. 76  Facts  
In 1997 Peter Thorner made a will by which, after a number of pecuniary legacies, left the 
residue of his estate, including his farm (Steart Farm, Cheddar) to his nephew, David 
Thorner. The will was subsequently destroyed and Peter died intestate in November 2005. 
In accordance with the intestacy rules Peter's estate, including Steart Farm, was available 
for his blood relatives, namely, his sisters. David commenced proceedings against Peter's 
sisters and the personal representative to claim the farm on the grounds that he had the 
benefit of a proprietary estoppel against Peter and his estate. The claim was based on the 
grounds that Peter has made an assurance to David that the farm would be left to him after 
his death and that David had relied on that assurance by working for a period of some 28 
years on the farm and thereby suffered a detriment. 
The relevant facts in David's claim to be entitled to a proprietary estoppel begin around 
about 1976 when Peter's first wife died at an early age. David helped Peter in some aspects 
of the running of the farm; however, after Peter's second marriage failed, David worked on 
the farm almost on a daily basis for no remuneration at all. The work included attending to 
the animals; mending the fences and gates; taking cattle to and from the market; working 
on farm buildings and bringing in hay. Additionally, it was observed that much of the 
paperwork relating to the management of the farm was in a mess when David first started 
helping out on the farm. David took it upon himself to sort out the paperwork and continued 
to look after it from then on. The court was told that by 1985, David was working 18 hours 
a day and 7 days a week for no payment. Several witnesses remarked that David was an 
exceptionally hard worker and had no social life as such. Other witnesses, including a 
surveyor, noted that in any discussions relating to the farm, Peter would always consult 
with David and his father (Peter's cousin). It was further noted that, despite working 
punishing hours, David lived on pocket money which his own parents gave him. 
Around the early 1990's Peter made a number of assurances that Steart Farm would be left 
to David. He handed David a number of documents and discussed with David that he would 
take over the farm and run it. The timing of these discussions was important because they 
were at a time when David was possibly thinking of pursuing his own career. The court was 
pointed to the fact that the timing of these discussions *Cov. L.J. 77  was duly to 
encourage David to stay with his parents, who lived nearby, and continue helping Peter. In 
1997, Peter made a will in which he left the farm to David along with a number of pecuniary 
legacies to others who had helped Peter on the farm. Peter's intention was clear, in that, he 
wanted David to have the farm. In 1998, Peter fell out with some of the persons who were 
receiving the pecuniary legacies under his will and thus destroyed the will with the intention 
of making another one. In 2004 Peter suffered a stroke and David continued to look after 
him, but more importantly, engaged in major work on the farm. Peter died in November 
2005 a couple of weeks after David's own father had died. 
 Decision  
John Randall Q.C. proceeded to deal with the claim for proprietary estoppel as laid out in 
the authorities and, in particular, by Robert Walker L.J. in Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch. 210. 
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Although the grounds for the setting up of a claim for proprietary estoppel are fairly well 
defined in the authorities, in other words, unconscionability founded on an expectation, 
reliance and detriment (see, Wilmott v Barber (1880) 15 Ch.D 96); the question has arisen 
as to what would be the effect if an expectation that property will be left in a will was 
revoked. In other words, what is the effect on estoppel where the person making an 
assurance says that he or she will leave the property in a will but then fails to do so. Is the 
claim for estoppel negated in such a situation? In Taylor v Dickens [1998] 1 F.L.R. 806 a 
promise was made by an elderly lady that she would leave her property to her gardener in 
her will. The gardener then offered to work for the lady without any remuneration. The lady 
duly made a will in which she left the property to the gardener and his wife, however, later 
revoked that will without telling the couple. The elderly lady died having left her property to 
someone else. When the gardener bought an action for estoppel against the lady's estate, 
the court rejected it on the grounds that what the lady had promised was that she would 
make a will and leave the property to him and not that she would not subsequently revoke 
it. The fact that she had made the will was sufficient to fulfil the expectation that she had 
created. This approach was, however, rejected in Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch. 210 by Robert 
Walker L.J. who explained that there was no requirement that there must be some binding 
agreement not to revoke the will. In his Lordship's opinion it was sufficient that there was 
some clear understanding that the property would be left to the person claiming the 
estoppel. On this basis, Randall Q.C. explained that, irrespective of the will, the expectation 
that David would inherit the farm went back many years before the execution of the will. 
 *Cov. L.J. 78  Having established the expectation, the court proceeded to entertain the 
question whether there was detrimental reliance. It is an integral part of the process of 
establishing an equity by way of estoppel that the claimant suffers a detrimental reliance. 
This requires the claimant to show that he acted on the faith of the expectation and as a 
consequence suffered a detriment. Reliance can take the form of monetary expenditure 
(as, for example, in Plimmer v Mayor of Wellington (1884) 9 App. Cas. 699) or giving up a 
career, education or looking after an ill person (see, for example, Ottey v Grundy [2003] 
EWCA Civ. 1176 and also Jennings v Rice [2003] EWCA Civ 159). Randall Q.C. explained 
that when the expectation became clear to David in 1990, David began to put in a lot of 
hard, unpaid work on the farm. This labour continued for a period of some 14 years. In the 
process, and as a result of the expectation, David continued to live near Peter rather than 
pursue some of the opportunities that presented themselves to him. In light of these 
findings, Randall Q.C. explained that the necessary degree of unconscionabilty required for 
a finding of estoppel had been proved. He explained that it would be grossly 
unconscionable to deny David a right to the farm by allowing the intestacy rules to stand. 
Having established the equity, the court moved on to the question of satisfying the equity. 
This required the court to determine how best the expectation would be fulfilled. Accepting 
that, in satisfying the equity, the court must have regard to the fact that the award must be 
proportionate to the expectation, Randall Q.C. held that David was entitled to the farm. In 
his opinion, given the expectation that David had, it was not disproportionate to award him 
the farm. 
 Commentary  
The decision in Thorner v Curtis provides a neat illustration for students of law of the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel and the informal creation of rights in land. Provided that 
the claimant can establish the expectation, which in the case of a promise to leave property 
in a will need not take the form of a binding agreement not to revoke the will, the court will 
find an equity in circumstances where there has been detrimental reliance. Such 
detrimental reliance in the face of an expectation will provide the necessary degree of 
unconscionability for the court to satisfy the equity by making an appropriate award. In 
satisfying the equity, the court can make one of two awards. Firstly, the court can award 
monetary compensation reflecting the loss that the claimant has suffered as a consequence 
of reliance. For example, in Dodsworth v Dodsworth (1973) 228 EG 1115 where the legal 
owner of land allowed *Cov. L.J. 79  her brother and his wife to live with her on their 
return from Australia. They spent some £700 on improvements on the expectation that 
they would be able to remain in the bungalow for as long as they wished. The Court of 
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Appeal held that they had no right of occupancy but were entitled to the return of the 
money spent. On the other hand, in Pascoe v Turner [1971] 1 W.L.R. 431 a lady was given 
a house and its contents in circumstances where she was led to believe that the house 
would be hers. 
In more recent cases the courts have explained that in satisfying the equity, they must 
have regard to proportionality. This means that the award must be proportionate to the 
expectation and detrimental reliance. The award should not confer a windfall on the 
claimant. For example, in Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 W.L.R. 431 the claimant was awarded 
the house which she was promised. However, compared to her reliance, the award of the 
house was rather generous and thus disproportionate. The issue of proportionality was 
discussed at length in Jennings v Rice [2003] 1 P & CR 8 where the claimant was a 
part-time gardener for Mrs Royle. In the late 1980's Mrs Royle stopped paying him, but 
provided him with a deposit so that he could purchase a house nearer to Mrs Royle and 
continue looking after her. The claimant did so under the belief that Mrs Royle would leave 
her property to him after her death; however, there were no specific assurances. In the 
latter years of Mrs Royle's life, Jennings stayed with her almost all of the time attending to 
personal care. When Mrs Royle died intestate leaving behind an estate worth £1.285m 
including a house worth £435,000, Jennings claimed to be entitled, by way of estoppel, to 
her estate. The trial judge awarded a sum of £200,000 reflecting the cost of employing a 
full time nurse. 
This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal, which explained that the remedy must not 
simply look to the expectation, but must also be proportionate to the reliance and 
detriment. 
It is submitted that the approach in Thorner v Curtis does represent a proportionate result. 
Although in Jennings v Rice the claimant had cared for Mrs Royle over a significant period 
of time, the facts of Thorner v Curtis are rather different in the sense that the amount of 
work and time expended by David Thorner was exceptional. 
Sukhninder Panesar, Principal Lecturer, Coventry University 
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